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Abstract
This paper presents a theoretical analysis of grace periods in the context of an overhang of external debt
creating a tax on domestic investment. The grace period arises as a Nash equilibrium strategy of the credi-
tor in a dynamic, noncooperative game. Its length is shown to depend on the planning horizon of the parties,
the discount factor and the growth prospect of the debtor country.
1. Introduction
Theoretical analyses of debt relief schemes are based on the debt overhang argument,
according to which the overhang of foreign debt impedes investment, and thus the
future repayment capacity of highly indebted countries.The argument implies that debt
relief schemes can have real effects and be mutually beneficial. Krugman (1989), Bulow
and Rogoff (1988, 1989a), and Froot (1989) have examined the benefits of debt reduc-
tions, buybacks and other relief schemes under the debt overhang assumption. In most
of this literature, the problem is reduced to a two-period analysis where default occurs
when the economy, affected by a stochastic shock, falls into a “bad state of nature.”
Debt relief schemes are incorporated into this framework to investigate their impact
on the country’s consumption, investment, growth, and secondary-market value of
debt. In this paper I provide a theoretical analysis of a debt relief scheme which has
not attracted much attention, “grace periods.” Throughout the analysis I will assume
that the debtor country has unused investment opportunities with positive net present
value, and show that the creditors’ grace period offer is a direct cure.
Evidence for the debt overhang hypothesis is not conclusive, though the hypothesis
has recently found strong support in papers by Borenzstein (1990) and Kaminsky and
Pareira (1996). The latter contains a survey of the literature and an empirical analysis
suggesting a robust negative impact of debt overhang on investment and growth.1
I utilize a simple one-sector growth model with features that resemble those in 
Lancaster (1973). The central planner of the debtor country allocates the output net
of debt repayments between investment and consumption. If the country is not able
to meet its contractual obligations, following the assumption usually made in the lit-
erature, it pays nonetheless a fraction of its output to the creditor unless the latter
offers a grace period.2 Initially, the country and its creditor will negotiate and imple-
ment a debt repayments plan which may include a grace period. This plan will emerge
as a Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game in which the creditor’s strategy is to choose
a time path of debt repayments, given the debtor country’s capital accumulation
process. And given the debt repayments path determined by the creditor, the debtor
country’s strategy is to determine a path of investment and growth.
The next section presents the game-theoretic model, which is analyzed in section 3.
Section 4 draws some conclusions and discusses extensions.
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2. The Model
Consider a one-sector, single-technique economy. The interest rate, r, is assumed to be
constant throughout the analysis. The planning horizon of the debtor country and its
creditor is infinite (a brief discussion of finite planning horizons and their impact on
grace periods is relegated to section 4).
The debtor country inherits a debt stock, B.Any negotiated restructuring of the debt
occurs at this stage. At any given time t, the debtor country’s productive capital stock,
Kt, determines its output through the production function f(Kt). For simplicity, I assume
that the rate of depreciation of capital is zero. The country allocates the output net of
debt repayments between investment and consumption. Its objective is to maximize
the discounted welfare of the representative agent, Ú•0 e-dtU(ct)dt, where d and U(ct)
denote the discount rate of the central planner and the utility of consumption at date
t. The function U(ct) is strictly concave.
To simplify the analysis, let the inherited debt B be a perpetuity, so that regular debt
repayments are b = rB. If the debtor declares its inability to meet regular debt repay-
ments, then the creditor can extract at most a fraction a of the output as repayments.
The defaulting country thus pays back af(Kt). This “gunboat technology” which
enforces repayments up to a certain limit is a standard assumption in the literature.
Clearly, default will occur as long as b > af(Kt).
There are three further assumptions: (A1) output f(Kt) is increasing and strictly
concave in Kt; (A2) the initial level of the capital stock K0 is such that rB = b > af(K0)
and f ¢(K0) > d; and (A3) there exists KR, a level of capital stock, such that b = af(KR)
and f ¢(KR) ≥ d. Assumption (A1) and f ¢(K0) > d are standard in the classical growth
literature. The latter implies that there will be growth, while b > af(K0) merely states
that the debtor country is highly indebted (K0 is low with respect to the debt stock B).
By (A3), there exists a feasible level of capital stock, KR > K0, such that the debtor
country makes a voluntary switch to regular debt repayments once it accumulates KR.
On the other hand, f ¢(KR) > d guarantees that capital will be accumulated beyond KR.
The date at which the capital stock attains KR is denoted TR.
The creditor’s problem is to determine the time path of rates of output transferred
as debt repayments, {ut}, which generates the highest present discounted value. If the
country defaults at date t, ut may at most be set equal to a. Note that the model’s
assumptions imply the debt overhang hypothesis: forcing the debtor country to 
pay more will decrease investment today, reduce growth and thereby the country’s
repayment-generating capacity tomorrow. This tradeoff may lead the creditor to set ut
= 0; i.e., to let the country pay no interest for some period of time, which is called a
“grace period.”




KTR = KR, (3)
and subject to given K0. In equation (2), v denotes the fraction of output devoted to
investment. This constraint is effective and the creditor takes into account the capital
accumulation process until date TR, defined implicitly by (3) and (A3). Note that TR
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will depend on the entire path of {ut}, and TR and {ut} will in turn depend on the debtor’s
investment policy, {ut}.3
At each date t, the debtor’s output net of debt repayments, (1 - ut)f(Kt), is allocated
between investment and consumption. vt(1 - ut)f(Kt) is added to the capital stock and




and equations (2) and (3). In the maximand stated in (4), V(KR, B) represents the max-
imized welfare as viewed from date T R. It is obtained by solving the following problem:
(6)
subject to ct = (1 - vt)f(Kt) - b and Kt = KR + Ú
t
0vsf(Ks)ds.The two players are thus placed
in a game situation until date TR. I will use the open-loop noncooperative Nash equi-
librium as the solution concept for this game.
It is worth reconsidering several features of the model before going through the
formal analysis.The analysis focuses on a debt relief scheme given a large external debt
generating a tax on investment, and leaves unexplained the reasons why and how the
initial large, overhanging debt has been accumulated. Uncertainty, exogenous shocks,
and the inherent moral hazard problems in sovereign lending are among the most cited
reasons for this phenomenon. The dynamic game is one of complete and perfect infor-
mation. The parties lack no information about each other’s objectives and there is no
external uncertainty nor shocks. It would be possible to extend the model to allow for
future exogenous shocks on output; this would not change my qualitative results con-
cerning the relationship between the length of grace periods and initial debt stock,
expected growth prospects and the investment path of the indebted country.The analy-
sis of this case would be more complex but it promises a richer set of potential out-
comes (occasional default periods followed by consecutive bad realizations of output,
possibly also reintroducing a grace period). A last point that should be mentioned is
that I do not consider the possibility of additional lending, even after the country settles
on its regular debt repayments path. This is assumed to keep the analysis simple and
tractable, and because the possibility of relending seems tangential to the length of
grace periods in the presence of an already large debt stock.4
3. The Analysis
The game defined by the objectives and constraints given in (1)–(6) can be solved back-
wards. First, consider the period after date TR where the debtor is on its regular debt
repayments regime. In this period, the debtor’s problem is a standard one-sector
growth problem with an initial capital stock KR. The Hamiltonian for this problem can
be written as
where g tDR is the costate variable or, as it is usually interpreted, the discounted valua-
tion of a marginal investment. Defining ltDR = edtg tDR, the actual value of g tDR, one obtains
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the two necessary conditions ltDR = U¢(ct) and ∂ltDR/∂t = -{f ¢(Kt) - d}ltDR, coupled with
the transversality condition limtÆ•e-dtltDRKt = 0. The first necessary condition states that
along the optimal investment path the valuation of a marginal increase in the capital
stock is equal to the foregone marginal utility of consumption. The second is obtained
through the condition -∂HDR/∂Kt = ∂g tDR/∂t. It yields an important dynamic property
of the investment path: for t ≥ TR, optimal investment rates v*t must be consistent with
the marginal utility of consumption diminishing at the rate f ¢(Kt) - d. By the trans-
versality condition, it follows that the capital stock must converge to a steady-state
level K
–
such that d = f ¢(K–). The path of investment v*t must decrease through time,
approaching zero asymptotically as t Æ •.
The dynamic game is effective in the period [0, TR].A Nash equilibrium for the game
described by (1)–(5) is a pair of control functions ({u*t },{v*t }) such that {u*t } solves the
creditor’s problem in (1) for {vt} = {v*t } and {v*t } solves the debtor’s problem in (4) for
{ut} = {u*t }. To find the Nash equilibrium of this game, we have two Hamiltonians, one
for the creditor’s problem and one for the debtor’s problem:
(7)
(8)
For the creditor’s problem, u*t maximizes (7). This yields the following necessary 
condition:
(9)
and u*t Œ [0, a] if g tCv*t = e-rt. This is interpreted as follows. A fraction v*t of one dollar
of output is added to the capital stock and its discounted valuation from the creditor’s
viewpoint is g tCv*t . If g tCv*t is less than e-rt, the discounted value of one dollar of debt
repayments, then the creditor will try to extract maximal debt repayments (u*t = a).
Otherwise it will set u*t = 0. The costate variable g tC satisfies
(10)
and the corresponding transversality condition g CTR = 0, which represents the fact that
the debtor country’s investment projects have no effect on the creditor’s objective
beyond date TR.
As for the debtor country’s problem, maximization of (8) with respect to vt yields
g tD = e-dtU¢(ct), where ct is defined by (5). Defining l tD = edtg tD yields the familiar neces-
sary condition ltD = U¢(ct). The corresponding transversality condition is lTRD = l TRDR ,
which requires that the debtor’s valuation of a marginal increase in its capital stock be
continuous at the neighborhood of t = TR. The evolution of ltD can be obtained by
taking the partial derivative of HD with respect to the state variable Kt:
(11)
The conditions above contain all the information concerning the properties of the
Nash equilibrium ({u*t }, {v*t }). First, g TRC = 0 implies that at the left neighborhood of TR
the creditor prefers not to leave the marginal dollar in the debtor country because its
valuation falls short of its discounted value as debt repayments: u*t = a. Using this fact
in (10), the evolution of gt at this neighborhood is given by
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(12)
Equation (12) clearly shows that the path of g tC is declining. The relevant question
for the analysis is whether there exists a date t such that gtCv*t = e-rt. If yes, the opti-
mality condition (9) would imply u*t = 0 for t Œ [0, t], which means that the creditor
offers a grace period [0, t]. The factors that affect t are identifiable in (12). The most
important of these factors is the evolution of the capital stock, hence that of the mar-
ginal productivity f ¢(Kt). Because the path of g tC becomes steeper at low levels of 
Kt, such a date t will exist if KR - K0 is “sufficiently large.” The term KR - K0 captures
the debtor country’s growth prospect. The larger is this growth prospect, the more the
process of capital accumulation merits the creditor’s consideration and the higher is the
duration of grace periods. A second important factor affecting the length of grace
periods is the speed of capital accumulation, as captured by the path of v*t . This 
path has a negative slope owing to the concavity of U(ct) and to the fact that marginal
utility must decline at a diminishing rate |d - (1 - a)f ¢(Kt)|. Thus moving backwards 
in time, the path of v*t becomes steeper. Combining this fact with (12) suggests that
g tCv*t Æ e-rt from below as t Æ 0. A grace period may thus exist if the debtor country is
willing to accumulate capital rapidly. This is intuitive: grace periods are most effective
when the investment-disincentive effect of debt repayments is very high, which is most
likely to be the case when K0 and the debtor’s discount rate d are low. The value of d
is of particular importance. If the debtor government’s planning horizon is expected
to be short owing to political cycles, d would be very high, the process of capital accu-
mulation would be slow, and the creditor would be reluctant to offer a grace period
even if the economy has a high growth prospect.
Invoking the perfect-foresight hypothesis, it can be shown that there will be a dis-
continuity on the path of v*t at the end of the grace period. Since l tD (the marginal
utility of consumption) must evolve smoothly, consumption at the left and right 
neighborhoods of t must be equal, ct- = ct +. This leads to 1 - vt*- = (1 - a)(1 - vt*+),
which implies a switch in the investment path by vt*- - vt*+.
4. Concluding Remarks
An important factor determining the effectiveness of grace periods, as mentioned in
section 3, is the planning horizons of the parties.The planning horizons depend on elec-
tion or political cycles in the debtor country and on pessimistic creditor beliefs con-
cerning future debt repayments. Under pessimistic beliefs no grace periods may exist.
This effect can easily be verified in a finite-horizon version of this model or by increas-
ing the discount rates d and r. When there are many creditors and one debtor, coordi-
nation problems among the creditors are also known to impede efficient agreements
to offer debt relief, including grace periods. A dynamic analysis of the coordination
problems with hidden actions for the indebted country will contribute to our under-
standing of dynamic creditor–sovereign borrower relationships.
This paper has emphasized that a comprehensive analysis of debt relief schemes
should also include grace periods. Debt-relief “Laffer curves” obtained with and
without grace periods may look quite different. Ruling out grace periods in the present
model would mean that the creditors keep extracting the maximum fraction of output
they can, which would yield an inefficiently long period of irregular, low repayments
owing to the negative impact on domestic investment and growth. Debt forgiveness
(i.e. a reduction in the initial stock of debt, B) works its effect indirectly by shorten-
 ∂g ∂ a g at t t t
rt
tt v f K e f KC C= - -( ) * ¢( ) - ¢( )-1 .
ing the length of the grace period and bringing the switch to regular debt repayments
to an earlier date, and also generates faster growth. A critical level of initial debt stock
can be found such that the discounted value of repayments is maximized by taking the
partial derivative of the creditor’s value function in (1) with respect to B and setting
it equal to zero. If the initial outstanding debt is higher, a debt forgiveness should be
used, of course coupled with a corresponding grace period. A reduction in the out-
standing debt would decrease the creditor’s welfare otherwise, while a grace period
may still be offered to maximize the discounted value of debt repayments by partly
alleviating the tax on the debtor’s investment.
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Notes
1. See also the collected papers in Sachs (1990) and the Symposium on New Institutions for
Developing Country Debt in the Journal of Economic Perspectives (1990) for the pros and cons
of this hypothesis.
2. The theoretical and empirical justification of this assumption can be found in Bulow and
Rogoff (1988, 1989b).The creditors’ hindering the trade of the defaulting country in world goods
and capital markets exemplifies this enforcement technology.
3. The variable ut corresponds to the variable “q” in Bulow and Rogoff (1988, 1989b). I allow
the creditor to choose this variable in the interval [0, a].
4. Another modeling possibility would be to consider a finite-maturity debt. This would bring
in additional considerations, such as rescheduling of both debt repayments and maturities, but
could be considerably more complex than the present model. See Bac (1995) for an infinite-
horizon, constant-output sovereign lending model that endogenizes both loan sizes and 
maturities.
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